gAtO-nOtEs– Stopping Pedophile websites in Tor 4 LE
Dark web drugs site Silk Road knocked offline by hacker – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22381046
From the IEEE report about “Trawling for Hidden Service” they explain as any network person knows that it take little more overhead to make a Tor connection than a regular Internet connection. (SSL-connections) That Tor-Relay will have to work harder and as more and more connections are made, Just like a DdoS attack but with a simple crawler we can bring down any Tor-Website from communicating with any new clients. The Tor-network has no load balance.
So a simple crawler looking for URL’s doing it’s work to gather information for a Tor search engine- Like I have – could accidentally play havoc on a Tor-websites -entry-relay —even silk road // no way pedro // so if we use enough of these crawlers we can stop people from getting to the website and they will have no clients.
Example for Law Enforcement:
Natural Spanking Website is Tor website- They have over 13,000 URL on their website – so that’s 13,000 pages of pedophile crap. If we launch 8 crawlers from different places to crawl this site’s 13,000 pages again and again and again – all at the same time coming from different directions. Tor has no load balance so the websites Guard-relays cannot keep all these connections up. The (-combine crawlers coming all at the same time-from all over the world ) will prevent new clients accessing the site. The site will be un-reachable. You know what Amazon ec2 VPS server would be a great choice for this test.
If we do this for about 2-3 weeks – the word will go out that the site is down – The site will have to deploy and advertise new URL’S. if we also plan a campaign of propaganda news-feeds about that website and spread it on Twitter and get all the groups that hate pedophiles (anonymous and other groups). We can bring down any pedophile site this way.
IEEE 2013 -Trawling for Tor- Hidden Service – http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf
From this paper we find new ways to go after the websites and find the IP and geo-location, we can take over the entry-guard-relays and get statistics and usage and maybe clients of the website.
- We have a way to get Tor-Websites stats- we have a method to measure the popularity of any hidden service without the consent of the hidden service operator.
- We will work on this way of stopping a Tor-website form operating -We show how connectivity to selected hidden services can be denied by impersonating all of their responsible hidden services directories.
- We will demonstrate a technique that allows one to harvest hidden service descriptors (and thus get a global picture of all hidden services in Tor) in approximately 2 days using only a modest amount of resources.
- We show how to reveal the guard nodes of a Tor hidden service.
- Harvest all known Tor-hiddens service-websites.
- We propose a large-scale opportunistic deanonymization attack, capable of revealing IP addresses of a significant fraction of Tor’s hidden services over a one year period of time.
Of course going after a website like this is only allowed by Law Enforcement – gAtO oUt