Tor Wacky Times and the NSA

gAtO rEaD – that Tor (The Deep Dark Web) is now all messed up by the NSA, FBI and LEO so all you bad guys using the Tor network better watch out, or should they???fed_links_01

Aug 5 the FBI snakes in Freedom Hosting and put a number of websites out of business in the Dark Web. They let the flames go out that they caught a bunch of Pedophile sites with that bust, but it does not seem so.

The Attack on the Dark Net Took Down a Lot More Than Child Porn – http://gawker.com/the-attack-on-the-dark-net-took-down-a-lot-more-than-ch-1081274609 – gAtO contribute to this article–

fed_usCitizenship_01Aug 19 – Millions of Tor Clients start to go up in numbers. What’s this all about, we get a bunch of Tor clients just hanging around doing nothing in Tor. Some say it’s a Bot-net or something like that. Then it growns 4, 5  million Tor users and the last week or so it starts to go down again. So what is all this about all these Tor Clients and the Tor- Botnet?fed_rent_a_hacker01

Oct 3– Silk Road get’s taken down, Oh the FBI had a copy of the Silk Road servers back in June just before the AUG 5 take down of FH by the FBI. So the Feds had Silk Road all this time and this is all they can do, can’t even get a few Bitcoin wallets- what a cluster fˆ%k—//fed_cc-paypal_01

Now you got NSA saying that Tor is cracked and the bad guys cannot use it. They claim that they can hack Tor anytime and anywhere with documents that a summer student left on how to hack the Tor network back in 2006. By the Way – most of these hacks do not work in Tor, maybe on a regular network but not on the Tor network.fed_hit_man_01

So now gAtO goes in search of Tor sites and a lot of sites went down by hook or crook —BUT someone has started to replace these Tor Hidden Websites in the Tor Network – But something is FuNnY – all these sites us the same web templates –

So now you can take a walk down memory lane and see all the older Tor-Websites have gone away and new ones have magicly re-appear.

fed_apple4bitcoin_01Now if this was the only place were this has happens OK sure, but at other Tor- Wiki Tor Link sites you will see the same thing – Commercial sites are all FuNnY and all the non-commercial Tor-websites are Tango Down.

So now Tor goes round and round but nobody knows what the heck is going on- In the Tor network – The Deep Dark Web run by Criminals or the FBI – you can answer these questions yourself by visiting the site –trust but Verify– ((not me))– gAtO oUt

fed_counterfiet_euro_50 fed_counterfiet_usd_01 fed_links_01 fed_mobile_steal_store_01 fed_uk_guns_01

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Silk Road down – Tor still OK

Silkroad Seized Coins Addresses are identifiers which you use to send bitcoins to another person.

– https://blockchain.info/address/1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX

I found what I was after – this is all the Bitcoin Wallet Address from Silk Road that the FBI has –

caveat – check your wallet number if it’s not listed then your wallet is still cool and the funds available  –MaYbE!!!

UPDATE: notice that SILK ROAD account is still paying out all this money to France, Germany all over the UE – 500 BTC – 100 -BTC at a time WoW – Someone is making off with all the money from the SR account-

Unspent Outputs 1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX – https://blockchain.info/unspent?active=1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX&format=html 

 gAtO sEe- the fact is that as always GREED is what got SilkRoad Tango Down. I been getting lot’s of slack about Tor and all that but sorry, it’s as safe as you make it. Tor gives you an edge and if you really need the privacy and do your research on Tor, you too can communicate anonymous FACT not fiction -// 

Now the Bitcoin aspect of this take down is what is really cool. This take down now makes BTC more legit since they can’t say yeah it all criminals using Bitcoins, na, na, na, – I saw the first few 1 million dollars BTC transaction the other day – but still “Bitcoin Buying and Selling is a pain the A$$” my new Bitcoin book coming out in a next months just in time for the holiday seasons – gAtO oUt

 

On 10/04/2013 02:21 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:

 OK, I just read the Maryland complaint. It’s obvious what happened.

 An FBI undercover agent contacted him, wanting to sell large quantities

of cocaine. He found a buyer, and delegated the details to his employee.

Said employee had full admin access to his servers.

His employee then provided his ACTUAL PHYSICAL ADDRESS to the undercover

FBI agent. The FBI mailed 1 Kg (very highly cut) cocaine to said

employee, and arrested him on receipt. Said employee soon told the FBI

all that he knew.

So now the FBI had access to the servers. There’s no reason to suspect

that they needed to compromise Tor to gain access, or for anything else.

There’s more drama about the murder for hire stuff, but it’s irrelevant.

 

Tor Usage goes UP PirateBay, Iran-Syria and Google-play Orbot

USCyberLabs Stats of the Tor Network Aug-27

USCyberLabs Stats of the Tor Network

gAtO hEaR _UPDATE-

Sudden rise in direct Tor users



On Tuesday 27th, Roger Dingledine drew attention to the huge increase of Tor clients running [14]. It seems that their number has doubled since August 19th according to the count of directly connecting users [15]. According to Roger this is not just a fluke in the metrics data. The extra load on the directory authorities is clearly visible [16], but it does not look that the overall network performance are affected so far [17]. The cause is still unknown, but there are already speculations about the Pirate Browser [18] or the new “anti-piracy” law in Russia which is in force since August, 1st [19]. As Roger pointed out, ?some good solid facts would sure be useful.?

[14] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-August/029582.html

[15] https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users&start=2013-05-29&end=2013-08-27&country=all&events=off#direct-users

[16] https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#dirbytes

[17] https://metrics.torproject.org/performance.html

[18] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-August/029584.html

[19] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-August/029583.html



Ever since the the NSA Prism program came out something else is going on in Tor. People want privacy and they will use anything they can to get it. Tor is one solution that a lot of people know about but there are other factors about the increase.

Piratebay.sx and it’s users are doing a lot more stuff with the new browser – There has not been a sustained increase in search traffic for the Pirate Browser on Google. Tor and “Tor browser” haven’t shown a spike in search, either. Could it be from users in Syria?  Also note that the Google Play Store has been unblocked in Iran, allowing distribution of Orbot/Orweb in that country to phones with the Play Store app installed (partial bootstrapping problem).

Syria had a spike from 1000 to 4000 but that’s a tiny fraction of the recent increase. Iran doubled from 4000 to 8000 which is also only a part of the increase. Is there a page listing each graph by country or overlapping them all?

The Tor Project also pushed out Orbot v12 to Google Play in the last few weeks – 2 separate updates. That would not account for all of the increase, but it could have prodded enough existing users who had not used Orbot in awhile to start the app up again. We have also seen about 75,000 new installs over the last 3 months.

So we have a lot of factors as the Tor network grows larger everyday– gATo oUt

 

Tor Network Consensus Document

gAtO lOOkInG – at the Tor-network intelligence, how does it do what it does. Tor takes volunteers Onion-relays and organizes them into different categories they are called “flags” –

—  known-flags Authority BadExit Exit Fast Guard HSDir Named Running Stable Unnamed V2Dir Valid  —

Of course there are only now 10 authority flags-servers own and controlled by some of the top people in the Tor-project community. These 10 Authority-relays control all the intelligence that Tor need to run and keep everything working automatic. Every few hours these relays gather the OR-relays and depending on how long they have been turned on, how much bandwidth they have what version of Tor-software and OS they have and put this together into one document then it does a calculation and assigns flags to the 3,500 or so volunteer OR-relays throughout the world. After it’s all said and done they produce a “Consensus Document and sends this information to every HSDir -OR-relay so that clients can find hidden service websites in Tor. The HSDIR relays have all the DNS information to find Tor-hidden service -websites…//

consensus document – May-2013

———————————————————————————-———————————————————————————

network-status-version 3

vote-status consensus

consensus-method 17

valid-after 2013-05-17 12:00:00

fresh-until 2013-05-17 13:00:00

valid-until 2013-05-17 15:00:00

voting-delay 300 300

client-versions 0.2.2.39,0.2.3.24-rc,0.2.3.25,0.2.4.5-alpha,0.2.4.6-alpha,0.2.4.7-alpha,0.2.4.8-alpha,0.2.4.9-alpha,0.2.4.10-alpha,0.2.4.11-alpha,0.2.4.12-alpha

server-versions 0.2.2.39,0.2.3.24-rc,0.2.3.25,0.2.4.5-alpha,0.2.4.6-alpha,0.2.4.7-alpha,0.2.4.8-alpha,0.2.4.9-alpha,0.2.4.10-alpha,0.2.4.11-alpha,0.2.4.12-alpha

known-flags Authority BadExit Exit Fast Guard HSDir Named Running Stable Unnamed V2Dir Valid

params CircuitPriorityHalflifeMsec=30000 UseOptimisticData=1 bwauthpid=1 pb_disablepct=0

 

dir-source tor26 14C131DFC5C6F93646BE72FA1401C02A8DF2E8B4 86.59.21.38 86.59.21.38 80 443

contact Peter Palfrader

vote-digest C9B36D4CE1E4E25D313DBCB9CAB01BD6402136BB

dir-source turtles 27B6B5996C426270A5C95488AA5BCEB6BCC86956 76.73.17.194 76.73.17.194 9030 9090

contact Mike Perry <mikeperryTAfsckedTODorg>

vote-digest 2974C1E86CE7D44B2A1B304DDED4D6965C519F6C

dir-source maatuska 49015F787433103580E3B66A1707A00E60F2D15B 171.25.193.9 171.25.193.9 443 80

contact 4096R/23291265 Linus Nordberg <linus@nordberg.se>

vote-digest 4C9F8F31152829E776531350A3D0A3AB4F601FBF

dir-source dannenberg 585769C78764D58426B8B52B6651A5A71137189A dannenberg.ccc.de 193.23.244.244 80 443

contact Andreas Lehner <anonymizer@ccc.de>

vote-digest E326C020E9462BA105EC190DFBE4EA8FADA3A138

dir-source urras 80550987E1D626E3EBA5E5E75A458DE0626D088C 208.83.223.34 208.83.223.34 443 80

contact 4096R/4193A197 Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>

vote-digest 9D6CB9D0890C4BF18D12BBB4F26F5BC762B081C3

dir-source moria1 D586D18309DED4CD6D57C18FDB97EFA96D330566 128.31.0.34 128.31.0.34 9131 9101

contact 1024D/28988BF5 arma mit edu

vote-digest 21FCEA71FE6597E39E586721F7DA65C3A74A4EA1

dir-source dizum E8A9C45EDE6D711294FADF8E7951F4DE6CA56B58 194.109.206.212 194.109.206.212 80 443

contact 1024R/8D56913D Alex de Joode <adejoode@sabotage.org>

vote-digest 0787DE217B45ED8895701D679F02E755A257AF4F

dir-source gabelmoo ED03BB616EB2F60BEC80151114BB25CEF515B226 212.112.245.170 212.112.245.170 80 443

contact 4096R/C5AA446D Sebastian Hahn <tor@sebastianhahn.net>

vote-digest EEECD55223C97CACF7655D897782B61B64C1CF03

dir-source Faravahar EFCBE720AB3A82B99F9E953CD5BF50F7EEFC7B97 154.35.32.5 154.35.32.5 80 443

contact 0x0B47D56D SiNA Rabbani (inf0) <sina redteam io>

vote-digest EE92CA0F3820E3BAFC22C41DFD107D4F4B34E542

r ididnteditheconfig6 AB+dZViiymIEpTtbx+9cX5Y32i0 sjraCwjE8lzInizQ0UPqTI1AHkE 2013-05-17 10:29:13 128.8.24.14 9001 9030

s Exit Fast Running V2Dir Valid

v Tor 0.2.3.25

w Bandwidth=14

p accept 20-23,43,53,79-81,88,110,143,194,220,389,443,464,531,543-544,554,563,636,706,749,873,902-904,981,989-995,1194,1220,1293,1500,1533,1677,1723,1755,1863,2082-2083,2086-2087,2095-2096,2102-2104,3128,3389,3690,4321,4643,5050,5190,5222-5223,5228,5900,6660-6669,6679,6697,8000,8008,8074,8080,8087-8088,8332-8333,8443,8888,9418,9999-10000,11371,19294,19638

r MukiMukiAmaguri ADwuo9jHaHhVHIjp8/rSBaoXkj8 qZ48RT3ftleevrpO/kNy1qeBAS0 2013-05-16 18:16:19 119.25.52.227 9001 9030

s Fast HSDir Running Stable Unnamed V2Dir Valid

v Tor 0.2.2.39

w Bandwidth=38

p reject 1-65535

———————————————————————————-———————————————————————————-

r= Version of Tor- -OS -timestamp -IP address

s= Flags of the Onion-relay

w= bandwidth that the relays has

p= Exit relay information

The 10 servers on top of the documents are the Tor- Authority the servers that have all the real power in Tor controlled by – SiNA Rabbani (inf0) <sina redteam io> – Sebastian Hahn <tor@sebastianhahn.net> – Alex de Joode <adejoode@sabotage.org> – arma mit edu – Andreas Lehner <anonymizer@ccc.de> – Linus Nordberg <linus@nordberg.se> –  Mike Perry <mikeperryTAfsckedTODorg> – Jacob Appelbaum – Peter Palfrader <jacob@appelbaum.net> –

These are the real master of the Tor network nah… just joking it’s in the code– gAtO oUt

 

There is a small set (say, around 5-10) of semi-trusted directory authorities.  A default list of authorities is shipped with the Tor software.  Users can change this list, but are encouraged not to do so, in order to avoid partitioning attacks.

Every authority has a very-secret, long-term “Authority Identity Key”. This is stored encrypted and/or offline, and is used to sign “key certificate” documents.  Every key certificate contains a medium-term (3-12 months) “authority signing key”, that is used by the authority to sign other directory information.  (Note that the authority identity key is distinct from the router identity key that the authority uses in its role as an ordinary router.)

Routers periodically upload signed “routers descriptors” to the directory authorities describing their keys, capabilities, and other information.  Routers may also upload signed “extra info documents” containing information that is not required for the Tor protocol. Directory authorities serve router descriptors indexed by router identity, or by hash of the descriptor.

Routers may act as directory caches to reduce load on the directory authorities.  They announce this in their descriptors.

Periodically, each directory authority generates a view of the current descriptors and status for known routers.  They send a signed summary of this view (a “status vote”) to the other authorities.  The authorities compute the result of this vote, and sign a “consensus status” document containing the result of the vote.

Directory caches download, cache, and re-serve consensus documents.

Clients, directory caches, and directory authorities all use consensus

documents to find out when their list of routers is out-of-date.

(Directory authorities also use vote statuses.) If it is, they download

any missing router descriptors.  Clients download missing descriptors

from caches; caches and authorities download from authorities.

Descriptors are downloaded by the hash of the descriptor, not by the

relay’s identity key: this prevents directory servers from attacking

clients by giving them descriptors nobody else uses.

 

All directory information is uploaded and downloaded with HTTP.

[Authorities also generate and caches also cache documents produced and

used by earlier versions of this protocol; see dir-spec-v1.txt and

dir-spec-v2.txt for notes on those versions.]

Mapping Tor Relays

gAtO- been working on Mapping Tor-OR and here is some fun stuff – just got o – https://maps.google.com – google maps – the for location type this inhttp://uscyberlabs.com/tormap.kml  – or the .kml file will load Google Earth to- Google Maps – or Google Earth – your flavor..// tor-map-01

You may need to reload it or hit the return a few times but you should get a big map of the world with Tor OR all over the place – This is a static view 2013-04-01 14:57:00 MET – I have a nice automated code that can produce this anytime with whatever the consensus document in Tor gives me. This is a good little tool to have and monitor all known Tor OR-relays.

tor_2010

Biggest Growth Tor OR Usage Washington-DC 2011-2013 

I found some mapping code from 2011 Tor-OR that shows all 900 OR-(2011)  in Tor at that time (currently – 3798 OR-relays june-2013) . Then I got a hold of some code that get’s me all OR-relays 2013. When I compared them both my biggest shock was the number of OR-relays in Washington, DC area shows the biggest growth (2011- 2013)  of OR-relays  on the To network.

 

So tell me why the US government seems to be the biggest user of Tor??? We did hear that The NSA Shroden guy had 2 stickers on his laptop computer – yeah the one with all the secret he got from the NSA – Sticker 1 – EFF 2 – Tor… does NSA use Tor?? it’s contractors do I guess….ummmmm

tor_2013

Last year we where running about 3,000 Tor-OR this year so far we have another 500 more OR bringing us up to 3,500 OR we have also increased the Authority-Directory servers to 10 from 8 that’s a good thing. Anyway here are some statistics from the last few days – gAtO oUt

 

Tor Network – Total Number of Routers: 3426 100%
Routers in Current Query Result Set: 3416 99.71%
Total Number of ‘Authority’ Routers: 10 0.29%
Total Number of ‘Bad Directory’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Bad Exit’ Routers: 2 0.06%
Total Number of ‘Exit’ Routers: 875 25.54%
Total Number of ‘Fast’ Routers: 3015 88%
Total Number of ‘Guard’ Routers: 1154 33.68%
Total Number of ‘Hibernating’ Routers: 1 0.03%
Total Number of ‘Named’ Routers: 2164 63.16%
Total Number of ‘Stable’ Routers: 2311 67.45%
Total Number of ‘Running’ Routers: 3426 100%
Total Number of ‘Valid’ Routers: 3426 100%
Total Number of ‘V2Dir’ Routers: 2087 60.92%
Total Number of ‘Directory Mirror’ Routers: 2087 60.92%

2013-04-01 14:57:00 MET

Mapping Tor OR – we will be doing more Tor-mapping project that will make things funs with Google-Maps – gAtO oUt

Tor Logs:- jun 16-1213

 

——————————————————————————————

Tor network – Application Server Details
Cache Last Updated (Local Server Time): 2013-06-16 14:57:00 MET
Last Update Cycle Processing Time (Seconds): 646
Current Cache Expire Time (Seconds): 300
Number of Routers In Cache: 3798
Number of Descriptors In Cache: 9172
Approximate Page Generation Time (Seconds): 0.0137
Aggregate Network Statistic Summary | Total Number of Routers:
Total Bandwidth of displayed Routers [KBytes/s]: 2572613
Total Number of Routers: 3798 100%
Routers in Current Query Result Set: 3796 99.95%
Total Number of ‘Authority’ Routers: 10 0.26%
Total Number of ‘Bad Directory’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Bad Exit’ Routers: 1 0.03%
Total Number of ‘Exit’ Routers: 894 23.54%
Total Number of ‘Fast’ Routers: 3303 86.97%
Total Number of ‘Guard’ Routers: 1228 32.33%
Total Number of ‘Hibernating’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Named’ Routers: 2244 59.08%
Total Number of ‘Stable’ Routers: 2363 62.22%
Total Number of ‘Running’ Routers: 3798 100%
Total Number of ‘Valid’ Routers: 3798 100%
Total Number of ‘V2Dir’ Routers: 2342 61.66%
Total Number of ‘Directory Mirror’ Routers: 2342 61.66%

——————————————————————————————

Tor Network – Application Server Details
Cache Last Updated (Local Server Time): 2013-06-07 22:02:39 MET
Last Update Cycle Processing Time (Seconds): 477
Current Cache Expire Time (Seconds): 300
Number of Routers In Cache: 3546
Number of Descriptors In Cache: 6712
Approximate Page Generation Time (Seconds): 0.0099

 

Aggregate Network Statistic Summary |
Total Bandwidth of displayed Routers [KBytes/s]: 2434525
Total Number of Routers: 3546 100%
Routers in Current Query Result Set: 3544 99.94%
Total Number of ‘Authority’ Routers: 10 0.28%
Total Number of ‘Bad Directory’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Bad Exit’ Routers: 2 0.06%
Total Number of ‘Exit’ Routers: 848 23.91%
Total Number of ‘Fast’ Routers: 3076 86.75%
Total Number of ‘Guard’ Routers: 1217 34.32%
Total Number of ‘Hibernating’ Routers: 1 0.03%
Total Number of ‘Named’ Routers: 2228 62.83%
Total Number of ‘Stable’ Routers: 2336 65.88%
Total Number of ‘Running’ Routers: 3546 100%
Total Number of ‘Valid’ Routers: 3546 100%
Total Number of ‘V2Dir’ Routers: 2131 60.1%
Total Number of ‘Directory Mirror’ Routers: 2131 60.1%

——————————————————————————————

Tor Network – Application Server Details
Cache Last Updated (Local Server Time): 2013-06-06 13:29:39 MET
Last Update Cycle Processing Time (Seconds): 539
Current Cache Expire Time (Seconds): 300
Number of Routers In Cache: 3502
Number of Descriptors In Cache: 6383
Approximate Page Generation Time (Seconds): 0.0084

 

Aggregate Network Statistic Summary |
Total Bandwidth of displayed Routers [KBytes/s]: 2474946
Total Number of Routers: 3502 100%
Routers in Current Query Result Set: 3501 99.97%
Total Number of ‘Authority’ Routers: 10 0.29%
Total Number of ‘Bad Directory’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Bad Exit’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Exit’ Routers: 849 24.24%
Total Number of ‘Fast’ Routers: 3049 87.06%
Total Number of ‘Guard’ Routers: 1201 34.29%
Total Number of ‘Hibernating’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Named’ Routers: 2225 63.54%
Total Number of ‘Stable’ Routers: 2355 67.25%
Total Number of ‘Running’ Routers: 3502 100%
Total Number of ‘Valid’ Routers: 3502 100%
Total Number of ‘V2Dir’ Routers: 2112 60.31%
Total Number of ‘Directory Mirror’ Routers: 2112 60.31%

——————————————————————————————

Tor network –Application Server Details
Cache Last Updated (Local Server Time): 2013-06-05 16:06:50 MET
Last Update Cycle Processing Time (Seconds): 582
Current Cache Expire Time (Seconds): 300
Number of Routers In Cache: 3534
Number of Descriptors In Cache: 6168
Approximate Page Generation Time (Seconds): 0.0098

 

Aggregate Network Statistic Summary | 
Total Bandwidth of displayed Routers [KBytes/s]: 2572752
Total Number of Routers: 3534 100%
Routers in Current Query Result Set: 3532 99.94%
Total Number of ‘Authority’ Routers: 10 0.28%
Total Number of ‘Bad Directory’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Bad Exit’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Exit’ Routers: 851 24.08%
Total Number of ‘Fast’ Routers: 3088 87.38%
Total Number of ‘Guard’ Routers: 1210 34.24%
Total Number of ‘Hibernating’ Routers: 0 0%
Total Number of ‘Named’ Routers: 2230 63.1%
Total Number of ‘Stable’ Routers: 2363 66.86%
Total Number of ‘Running’ Routers: 3534 100%
Total Number of ‘Valid’ Routers: 3534 100%
Total Number of ‘V2Dir’ Routers: 2123 60.07%
Total Number of ‘Directory Mirror’ Routers: 2123 60.07%

——————————————————————————————

 

Tor network –Application Server Details
Cache Last Updated (Local Server Time): 2013-06-04 02:11:43 MET
Last Update Cycle Processing Time (Seconds): 553
Current Cache Expire Time (Seconds): 300
Number of Routers In Cache: 3599
Number of Descriptors In Cache: 5817
Approximate Page Generation Time (Seconds): 0.01

——————————————————————————————

 

Tor network –Application Server Details
Cache Last Updated (Local Server Time): 2013-05-29 23:19:07 MET
Last Update Cycle Processing Time (Seconds): 645
Current Cache Expire Time (Seconds): 300
Number of Routers In Cache: 3582
Number of Descriptors In Cache: 16099
Approximate Page Generation Time (Seconds): 0.1987

——————————————————————————————

——————————————————————————————

Weaponize the Tor Network:

weaponizing-the-web1-720x2808

Weaponize the Web

prism-01

if you got nothing to hide – you got nothing to worry about

 gAtO wAs – asked the Tor-Network is slow as heck, does not support sending outgoing email and does not support UDP packets of the TCP/IP protocol, so can it be weaponized? Maybe monitoring the Tor-Network like Prism and Nucleon or the Japan based Daedalus Monitoring program at the very least?

Data collection in Tor:

I guess this all depends on your definition of what a weaponize cyber weapon is-///-IP theft- here we have a vast collection of both /IP-(intellectual Property) and /copyright – /hacking /sql-i in Tor// -.- /hacktivism -how about /personal privacy online-collection of all internet transaction and data sharing with Google, Facebook, Microsoft and others— /government censorship of it’s people /Worldwide Internet monitoring-///  Like a room 641a for Tor only traffic.

prism-03

Daedalus Monitoring program

Mix a little more counter-offensive cyber class weapons like Stuxnet, Flame and DuKu – add a bit of misinformation and propaganda to the mix and we have a better question.

Next we have a more military type cyber weaponized solution. Control Drones planes in Tor -another one is dDos, attacks on the electric grid or sabotage satellites. Cyber attacks like power outage, hacking attacks on cell phones and wall street computers and add traffic lights and traffic in the northeast going wacko. Like they say trains, planes and automobiles are all connected to cyberspace from China to Canada… prism-02

Tor can also be used in all the above scenario- Yes big brother/sister it can. So the answer is Yes, but Tor is not the pony network that can do this work. There are other kinds of anonymized networks that can be used, and with your own relays all over the world you can create your own Tor-private network that only you use so it will be faster and side nobody can see it – well Tor is not the only network one to watch for cyber weaponized products – gAtO oUt